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Tracing the use of evaluations in legislative processes in Swiss 
cantonal parliaments 
Version accepted for publication in Evaluation and Program Planning, published article: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2016.09.007 
Several studies have challenged the notion that members of parliament use information from 
evaluations to make policies. However, it is also argued that the function of evaluations in an 
inherently political context such as parliament is to provide arguments and justifications rather than 
simply supply information for policymaking. This paper provides a fine-grained account of the use of 
evaluations by members of parliament in the context of political conflict. Previous research has 
highlighted the importance of this factor, but the findings are controversial. Here, four case studies of 
policy processes in two Swiss cantonal parliaments illustrate that political conflict is highly context-
specific. Documentary analysis and interviews show that the members of parliament used evaluations 
to inform themselves as well as to gain political support in the moderately contested case. This both 
supports and challenges previous research. Comparing the cases reveals that the administration’s use 
of evaluations strongly influences their use in the non-professional cantonal parliaments. However, 
Switzerland’s semi-direct democracy and its conflict-resolving mechanisms shape and limit this role, 
particularly if political conflict is high. 
Keywords: evaluation use; policymaking; parliament; Switzerland; case study 
Introduction 
The question of how evaluations are used is at the centre of research on evaluation; however, 
comparatively few studies have been devoted to members of parliament (MPs) as users of 
evaluations. Dealing with increasingly complex and interconnected issues, modern 
parliaments are confronted with the demand to base their policies and decisions on sound 
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evidence such as that provided by evaluations. From a democratic theory perspective, this 
also raises fears that pursuing a rational, technical approach to policymaking undermines the 
representative function of parliaments. Yet, research does not support such fears of 
technocratic policymaking in parliaments. Rather than base policies on evaluations, MPs use 
them for political purposes such as bolstering arguments or legitimizing decisions (Frey, 
2012; Shulock, 1999; Weiss, 1989; Whiteman, 1985). Scholars have argued that research needs 
to integrate the inherently political context of parliaments and “the political factors which 
affect use" (Whiteman, 1985, p. 294). According to this argument, the role of evaluation is not 
only to inform policies but to provide explanations, arguments, and justifications (Henry, 
2000; Majone, 1989; Shulock, 1999).  
This paper aims to answer the following questions: When, by whom, and for what purposes 
are evaluations used in the parliamentary policy process? In this respect, the paper further 
addresses the question of how evaluation use is shaped by political conflict. Many scholars 
have highlighted the role of this context factor (Esterling, 2011; Frey, 2012; Jenkins-Smith & 
Sabatier, 1993; Whiteman, 1985). However, previous findings are contradictory. Evaluation 
use has been observed both in stable political contexts and when issues were controversial 
and political actors disagreed (Nutley, Walter, & Davies, 2007). 
By studying four most similar cases of policy processes in two Swiss cantonal parliaments, 
this paper investigates evaluation use across different levels of political conflict. 
Switzerland’s semi-direct democracy1 is often seen as an obstacle for evaluation use. In order 
to prevent the failure of bills in referendums, Swiss policymaking is oriented towards 
gathering consensus. This leaves little room for evidence to shape policymaking, particularly 
                                                     
1  The system in Switzerland is described as a semi-direct democracy. It mixes both representative and direct 
democracy, as a referendum is not mandatory for all decisions (Linder, 2010). 
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if the political actors have strongly conflicting interests and a referendum is already expected 
at early stages of the policy process (Sager & Rissi, 2011; Widmer & Neuenschwander, 2004). 
Yet, the institutionalization of evaluation in Switzerland is very advanced compared to other 
countries, notably in the legislatures (Jacob, Speer, & Furubo, 2015). In a recent survey, Swiss 
cantonal and federal MPs also indicated that they seek and use evaluations rather frequently 
(Author et al., 2014). Swiss parliaments are generally non-professional, and previous 
research on the federal parliament has highlighted the importance of the administration for 
policymaking and evaluation use (Frey & Widmer, 2011; Widmer, 2009). This is supposedly 
more pronounced in the member states of the cantons whose parliaments have fewer 
resources than the federal parliament. Having their own constitutions, parliaments, 
governments, and courts, the cantons retain all powers that are not constitutionally granted 
to the Federation (Linder, 2010). Therefore, the cantons both share a common framework and 
have comprehensive legislative competencies, which makes them ideally suited for case 
comparisons. 
Evaluation use is traced by examining diverse documents from governments, parliaments, 
and political parties and through interviews with MPs and civil servants. The case studies 
show that the MPs most often used evaluations to inform themselves in the comparatively 
moderately contested case. This supports previous hypotheses stating that MPs should be 
particularly open to evaluations in such situations (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993). The case 
study evidence also contrasts with previous studies (Frey, 2012; Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 
1993; Whiteman, 1985), because the MPs made comparatively little use of evaluations to 
gather political support in the most contested case. The case comparison shows that political 
conflict is shaped by the framing of the issue at hand and suggests that the administration’s 
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use of evaluations can facilitate MPs’ use of them. However, if political conflict is high and a 
referendum is expected, the impact of the administration’s use is limited.  
This paper first provides an overview of the legislative procedure in the Swiss cantons. It 
then defines evaluation use and political conflict as a context factor. After a description of the 
methodological approach, the case study evidence is presented. The paper concludes with a 
comparison of the cases and a discussion.  
Law-making in the Swiss cantons 
While exact rules and procedures differ between the cantons, this paper distinguishes three 
broad phases of legislative procedure 2 : pre-parliamentary, parliamentary, and post-
parliamentary. In the pre-parliamentary phase, after the legislative procedure has been initiated, 
an administrative unit drafts a bill and consults the administration and third parties such as 
municipalities, interest groups, and political parties. Then, the government decides on the 
proposed bill and submits its proposal to the parliament. This decision marks the beginning 
of the parliamentary phase. The bill is then assigned to a parliamentary committee for 
preliminary deliberation. The committee can usually hold hearings to consult interest groups, 
practitioners, and experts. Consequently, this step is thought to be important for involving 
evaluations in the process. After deliberation in the committee and the parliamentary party 
groups, the bill is discussed in a plenary meeting. The parliament first decides whether to 
enter the bill and, if it does, proceeds to the first reading of the bill, in which the bill is 
discussed paragraph by paragraph. After a more or less extensive second reading in the 
committee, the parliamentary party groups, and subsequently the plenum, the parliament 
usually proceeds to the final vote. In the post-parliamentary phase, the law is published and, if 
                                                     
2 This distinction is similar to Linder’s (2010) for the federal level. 
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requested, a referendum is held. In some cantons, the referendum can include a 
counterproposal, by which voters can propose specific amendments to the bill. The 
parliament then discusses this counterproposal and decides on giving a recommendation to 
the voters and if it does, whether to recommend the initial bill or the counterproposal. 
This paper focuses on the pre-parliamentary and particularly on the parliamentary phase. 
Previous research suggests that evaluation use occurs in diverse forms in the pre-
parliamentary and early parliamentary phases, but in the later stages its use for political 
purposes prevails (Weiss, 1989; Whiteman, 1985). Moreover, the documents prepared by the 
administration in the pre-parliamentary phase are thought to be an important information 
source for the MPs. 
Theoretical framework 
Evaluation use: definition and forms of use 
This paper investigates the use of policy evaluations. However, it is questionable whether 
MPs differentiate evaluations from other studies (Frey, 2012). The MPs’ use of evaluations is 
therefore understood to mean that MPs use information that is usually acquired from policy 
evaluations. In order to define the information acquired from policy evaluations, this paper 
draws on the logic model of a (public) policy. The logic model represents an implicit theory 
of how a policy3 works. It describes the causal relationships assumed to exist between the 
elements of a policy. The logic model usually distinguishes five stages: input, process, output, 
outcome, and impact (WK Kellogg Foundation, 2004). An evaluation consequently provides 
information about one of these stages, and the information was gained by following a 
                                                     
3 The logic model is also used for other objects of evaluations. 
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systematic and transparent approach. This paper hence refers to the use of the findings of 
evaluations and not to changes due to MPs’ participation in evaluations, which rarely occurs.  
This paper further distinguishes between analytical use and political use of evaluations. This 
distinction follows from Frey’s (2012) conception, but it is also connected to the classical 
forms in research on evaluation. Analytical use encompasses instrumental and conceptual 
forms of use. The starting point of analytical use is to draw on or to solicit evaluations as 
tools with which to improve policies. MPs therefore have to be open to findings and to 
altering their position. Political use lacks this intent of improvement and refers to all forms of 
symbolic use for the purpose of gaining political support. MPs do not have to alter their 
position to use evaluations politically. Moreover, those two forms are understood to be both 
complementary and substitutive. 
MPs can acquire the information provided by evaluations in different ways. They can, for 
instance, read an evaluation report or its management summary. However, their resources 
for gathering knowledge, particularly time, are restricted. As information is often 
transmitted orally in parliaments, it seems more likely that MPs acquire information through 
presentations by experts or the administration (Frey & Widmer, 2011; Weiss, 1989; Whiteman, 
1995); MPs do not have to read evaluations themselves in order to use them.  
Political conflict 
Political conflict is a context factor that has been much discussed in research on evaluation 
use. Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993, p. 49) describe it in their framework as “the degree of 
incompatibility of basic beliefs of competing coalitions”, and it can basically be understood 
to mean the degree to which political actors disagree concerning a decision (Boswell, 2009; 
Esterling, 2011). Most previous research suggests that a high level of political conflict hinders 
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analytical use (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993; Weiss, 1999; Whiteman, 1985). Within such 
environments, MPs are less receptive or entirely unreceptive to sound evidence. Contrasting 
arguments are that the more that is at stake, the more important it is to be adequately 
informed, and that evaluation can also contribute to resolving political conflicts (Nutley, et 
al., 2007; Valovirta, 2002). Other theories consider the relationship between analytical use 
and political conflict as non-linear. They expect analytical use to occur most often in 
environments with a moderate level of political conflict. Investing in analytical activities 
does not seem necessary when an issue causes no or barely any disagreement, and at 
moderate levels of political conflict, actors rather feel the need to inform themselves and are 
still open to evidence (Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993). Similar to analytical use, some 
scholars also expect political use to occur most often in situations with moderate levels of 
political conflict, as MPs are then most receptive to evidence-based arguments (Esterling, 
2011). However, most previous research indicates that MPs feel particularly inclined to use 
evaluations politically within high-conflict environments (Frey, 2012; Jenkins-Smith & 
Sabatier, 1993; Weible, 2008; Whiteman, 1985). If much is at stake, MPs should not only feel 
the need to integrate evaluations in their argumentation, but also to use them as a tactical 
means to delay the process or for other, diverse political purposes.  
As Figure 1 shows, it is expected that MPs most often use evaluations analytically in 
situations of moderate political conflict. It is also expected that the higher the level of 
political conflict, the more often MPs use evaluations politically. If one uses an evaluation 
analytically to become informed, it seems intuitive to also use it politically, for example by 
referring to it in a speech. Political use is therefore always depicted as being as high as or 
higher than analytical use. Moreover, while political conflict and evaluation use have so far 
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been treated as continuous variables, they are reduced to categories for the comparison and 
analysis of the cases. 
Figure 1: Relationship of evaluation use and political conflict 
 
Case selection and methodological approach 
Evaluation use is investigated in four cases of parliamentary policy processes concerning 
policy measures. Each case is therefore embedded in a parliamentary policy process 
concerning a larger policy project with several policy measures. Two cases are analysed for 
the cantonal parliaments of Bern and Zurich respectively, so that each case has a matching 
counterpart in the other parliament. The four cases concern two policy measures: 
 Usage-based billing of heating and domestic hot water (UBB) 
 Taxation scheme for energy-efficient cars 
The case selection follows the logic of most similar cases. Both measures can be considered as 
hard, technical issues. The policy fields of energy and transportation policy have been 
selected because most decisions lie within the competence of the cantonal parliaments and 
evaluation activity is fairly well developed in these fields. Bern and Zurich seem suited for 
the case studies, as they are both large cantons that have the resources to conduct or 
low high 
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analytical use 
political use 
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commission studies. Their cantonal parliaments are also similar in size, professionalization, 
and party system. Additionally, evaluations4 were available in all cases. If this were not so, 
evaluations of course could not be used and the cases would not be relevant to this study 
(Mahoney & Goertz, 2004). These selection criteria and conditions generally facilitate 
evaluation use. Technical issues should be easier to comprehend analytically, which should 
foster analytical use in particular (Frey, 2012; Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993). While political 
use also seems probable in technical issues, the literature remains unclear whether they are 
particularly prone to political use (Boswell, 2009; Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993).   
The cases differ mainly in their levels of political conflict. The usage-based billing of heating 
and domestic hot water was less contested in either canton than the taxation scheme for 
energy-efficient cars5. The parliamentary committee systems differ in the two cantons. Zurich 
has a standing committee system, whereas Bern had an ad-hoc committee system at the time 
of the study6. While this case selection therefore facilitates the cases’ comparison, it limits the 
generalizability of the findings to rather technical policy measures in Swiss cantons. 
Official documents from the executive, the minutes of the committee and plenary meetings, 
evaluation reports and the political parties’ media releases7 are analysed to reconstruct the 
                                                     
4  The cantons selected should be the object of at least one evaluation. If only ex ante evaluations were available, 
this criterion was extended to the cantons in general.  
5  The vote results in the plenary debate (final vote, minority proposals) and the existence of a referendum 
served as criteria to select cases. 
6  Standing committees are permanent bodies, whereas ad hoc committees are only appointed for one bill. Bern 
changed to standing committees in June 2014, a change that does not concern the cases analysed in this study.  
7  Pre-parliamentary phase: law effective during policy process, MPs’ parliamentary requests and minutes of the 
corresponding plenary debate, consultation procedure’s documentation (decrees of the Government Council, 
bill, report, parties’ answers), government’s proposal (bill, report). Parliamentary phase: protocols of the 
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policy process, to trace the evaluation use, and to identify and describe the evaluations that 
may have been at the MPs’ disposal. Moreover, up to four interviews were conducted per 
case. One of the interviews was conducted with a civil servant; the other interviewees are 
current or former MPs8. A case study protocol was used to set the guidelines for conducting 
and comparing the case studies. 
The analysis follows the questions of when evaluations were used, by whom and for what 
purposes. Their use by MPs, the political parties, and the administration is examined. The 
administration is included as it is likely that, when presenting evaluations in the documents, 
it also provides an important model for the MPs and their use. The analysis of analytical use 
is mainly based on the interviews and the syntheses of the cases. Identifying the actors’ 
intentions is, however, only possible to some extent, as it is dependent not only on the actors’ 
memories but also on their interpretation and on their willingness to openly communicating 
their recollection of events. Political use can additionally be observed in the documents when 
the political actors refer to evaluations. For the analysis, it is assumed that the later that 
evaluation use occurs, the more likely it is to be for the purpose of gaining political support.  
The documents and the interviews are also analysed to better characterize the political 
conflict. As the committee and plenary discussions of paragraphs are organized by the 
minority proposals of MPs or groups, the number and votes on these proposals are studied. 
Whether prominent actors can be identified on both sides further characterizes the conflict. It 
                                                                                                                                                                     
committee and plenary meetings, additional reports of the government; both phases: press releases of the 
seven principal parties; evaluation reports published between the last amendment of the measure and the 
final vote. Committee protocols are confidential; the other documents are all publicly available.  
8  In total 14 interviews. MPs: the committee's president, one prominent proponent or opponent in the 
committee. 
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is also considered whether a referendum was probable and whether the measure studied 
was of importance within the larger policy project and with respect to a possible referendum.  
The following descriptions of the case studies each begin by presenting the policy measure 
and the evaluations available. Afterwards, the policy process, the political conflict, and 
analytical and political use are portrayed, first for the Canton of Bern and then for the 
Canton of Zurich.  
Case study: Usage-based billing of heating and domestic hot water 
Usage-based billing of heating and domestic hot water (UBB)9 is a policy measure intended 
to decrease the energy consumed for heating and hot water by installing devices that 
measure this consumption and then bill accordingly for each apartment (see Figure 2 for a 
detailed logic model). While UBB was introduced in new buildings in the 1980s and has not 
been contested since, the legislation concerning existing buildings has been amended 
continuously since the 1990s. With the Federal Act on the Supply of Energy in 2007 and the 
publication of model regulations for cantons in 2008, the cantons were obliged to revise or 
introduce provisions for completely renovated existing buildings once more. 
                                                     
9  The German term is Verbrauchsabhängige Heiz- und Warmwasserkostenabrechnung 
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Figure 2: Logic model of the UBB 
 
Several, mostly ex post, evaluations were available when the cases were discussed in 
parliament. The latest, and most comprehensive study from 2008 describes the design and 
implementation of UBB for several cantons, including Bern (Rieder, Schwenkel, & Züsli, 
2008). It examines the landlords' and the tenants' acceptance of the UBB and presents 
calculations on the UBB's effects, which confirm the findings of earlier studies (COPLAN ibe, 
1997; Ökozentrum Langenbruck, 1995). The Canton of Bern commissioned two evaluations 
in the 1990s and an overall evaluation of its energy policy in 200010. The Canton of Zurich did 
not commission any evaluation of the UBB but was the object of an evaluation commissioned 
by the federal administration in the 1990s. In addition, civil servants interviewed in both 
cantons stated that they observed the implementation and its effects with the help of 
technical reports. 
                                                     
10  Department of Transport, Environment and Water of the Canton of Bern (1991); Iten, Hammer, Kessler, and 
Frick (2000); Sommer (1989) 
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Case 1 – Uncontested measure in a very highly contested Cantonal Law on Energy 
The UBB was debated during the complete revision of the Bernese Cantonal Energy Law 
between 2009 and 2011. It was only discussed during the committee’s deliberations. At this 
committee meeting, a minority proposal was brought forward to re-introduce the UBB in all 
existing buildings, which would have led to more restrictive provisions. This proposal was 
put forward by the social democrats but was rejected. The minority proposal was withdrawn 
from the subsequent plenary debate as the social democrats' contact in the administration 
said "that this does not do much from an energy-policy perspective" (Case1-MP1) 11 . 
Consequently, it was not discussed in any of the plenary debates. 
The interviews confirmed this impression of comparatively very little political conflict. The 
interviewees could not identify any political actors who strongly lobbied for or against the 
measure. However, all the interviewees remembered that the UBB was fiercely debated in 
2000: “back then it was decided how it is and afterwards it was not called into question" 
(Case1-MP3). The UBB was considered as an unimportant element of the revision, since 
many other elements were strongly contested. Several interviewees described the complete 
revision of the Cantonal Energy Law by the executive as an exemplary project. It was 
contested from the beginning, and the Liberals and the right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP) 
in particular sharply criticized the bill’s version in the government's proposal to the 
parliament. The SVP and the Bernese Association of Homeowners12 afterwards launched a 
counterproposal13, which received a majority in the referendum. 
                                                     
11  Original in German, author’s own translation (applies for all following quotations). 
12  Original: Hauseigentümerverband Bern und Umgebung, author’s translation 
13  The provisions concerning the UBB were the same in the bill and the counterproposal. 
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Analytical use 
The interviews suggest no analytical use by the MPs and somewhat indirect evaluation use 
by the administration in the policy process. While the administration systematically collects 
evaluations or technical reports and uses them to draft papers or bills, it was not drawn on 
any particular study concerning the UBB. "Evaluations were already made" (Case1-Admin), 
experiences gained. The administration knew of the latest study, but this did not change its 
opinion. The MPs interviewed could not remember using any evaluation studies when 
informed themselves about the UBB. None of the interviewees could recall evaluations being 
mentioned later during the committee meetings.  
Political use 
Political use of evaluations is not observed in the documents and the interviews during 
either the pre-parliamentary phase or the parliamentary phase. The administration did not 
cite evaluations in either the documentation of the consultation procedure or the 
government's proposal. The parties commented on the UBB in the consultation procedure, 
but they did not refer to evaluations. All the major parties also published one or more press 
releases in both the pre-parliamentary and the parliamentary phases, but these did not 
mention the UBB. No studies were cited during the committee meetings either.  
In summary, Case 1 involved very little conflict. Neither analytical nor political use of 
evaluations by the MPs can be observed. 
Case 2 – Little conflict over either measure or Energy Law 
In Zurich, the UBB was debated during the revision of the Energy Law in 2010 and 2011. A 
single initiative on the UBB by private citizens14 was also examined during this revision. 
                                                     
14  Single initiative 278/2006. In the canton of Zurich, a private citizen can launch an initiative that is then 
discussed if at least 60 MPs support it.  
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Consequently, the UBB was discussed twice in both committee and parliament. In both 
instances, a group of left and green parties and one small moderate party supported more 
restrictive provisions than those proposed by the government and the committee’s majority. 
During the discussion of the Energy Law, two minority proposals on more restrictive 
provisions were rejected. The single initiative was discussed three months later by a 
parliament that had been newly elected in the meantime. This vote was very close, but the 
single initiative was eventually rejected. 
The interviewees considered the UBB as an unimportant, apolitical element of the Energy 
Law: "the real political battle took place in the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s." (Case2-Admin). While the political positions were clear, the interviewees could not 
identify political actors who argued strongly against the UBB. The opponents probably 
expected that the minority proposals would have no chance. Based on previous experience, 
the government also expected that more restrictive provisions would not gain a majority and 
would be difficult to implement (Regierungsrat Zürich, 2010). Moreover, the revision of the 
Energy Law was generally not seen as very important, as only a few measures had to pass 
parliament. 
Analytical use 
The interviews show that evaluations were only indirectly used in the policy process. When 
elaborating the bill, the administration relied on their accumulated knowledge about the 
UBB and therefore used evaluations and the experiences gained during the implementation 
of the measure conceptually. Working with a specific study or commissioning one was seen 
as unnecessary thanks to this rich daily experience. Moreover, the recent studies were 
examined critically, as they were commissioned by the federal administration and not the 
cantons. The MP interviewed did not read an evaluation, but instead listened to personal 
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advice from the proposers of the single initiative: "one maybe tries to go for studies less than 
for experts whom one knows; we hope that they have also read a study now and then" 
(Case2-MP1). In the parliamentary phase, the whole committee then consulted the proposers 
of the single initiative. The proposers presented information on the effects and argued why 
they wanted to re-introduce the UBB, but they did not refer to evaluations. Moreover, 
proposers are invited to hearings as a matter of course, and the committee did not ask for 
other experts or studies.  
Political use 
Only single instances of political use can be observed in the policy process. One observation 
of political use by the government is found in the pre-parliamentary phase. The government 
stated in the proposal that "with the introduction of the usage-based billing of heating and 
domestic hot water the energy consumption can be reduced about 10 to 15 per cent, as 
several studies by the Federation and the cantons show15." Since no press releases are found 
for the pre-parliamentary phase, no political use by the political parties can be observed. 
While neither the administration nor the MPs alluded to evaluations during the committee 
meetings in the parliamentary phase, political use can be found once in the plenary 
discussion. One MP cited a study in the plenary debate concerning the single initiative. The 
MP argued that the UBB is likewise important for small and medium-sized companies, since 
“60 per cent of the SMEs do not know their energy consumption, according to a recent 
                                                     
15  Government Council of the Canton of Zurich (2008). Bericht und Antrag des Regierungsrates an den Kantonsrat 
zur Einzelinitiative KR-Nr. 278/2006 betreffend Einführung der individuellen Heizkostenabrechnung [Report and 
proposal of the Government Council to the Cantonal Parliament concerning the single initiative no. 278/2006 regarding 
the introduction of the individual billing of heating], p. 2. 
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survey by the Federal Office of Energy16.” Parties’ press releases are not found for the 
parliamentary phase.  Neither the policy expert nor the MP interviewed could remember 
using evaluations politically. 
To summarize, Case 2 involved little political conflict. The MPs indirectly used evaluations 
analytically by asking experts, who did not refer to evaluations. Political use by the MPs is 
observed just once. 
Case study: Taxation scheme for energy-efficient cars 
The taxation scheme for energy-efficient cars is a fiscal measure that is intended to set an 
incentive for buyers of new cars to choose more energy-efficient cars. This should ultimately 
reduce energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions (see Figure 3). Joint initiatives of 
several cantonal administrations and requests from MPs of diverse parties put taxation 
schemes for energy-efficient cars on the agenda of both cantons. In 2007, a model scheme 
was elaborated by representatives from the federal administration and 18 of the cantonal 
administrations, including Bern and Zurich, together with experts from the Swiss Federal 
Institute of Technology in Zurich (ETHZ) and a private research company. The cantons then 
adapted the scheme to suit their taxation systems and to respond to MPs’ requests. 
                                                     
16  Minutes of the Cantonal Parliament of Zurich, 6th meeting on June 6, 2011, p. 359. 
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Figure 3: Logic model of the taxation scheme for energy-efficient cars 
 
Because taxation schemes were discussed as fiscal energy policy measures from the late 
1990s, mostly ex ante evaluations were available when the cases were debated in parliament. 
While several studies were commissioned by the federal administration in the early 2000s17, 
the largest and most recent contribution was made by a research project at the ETHZ from 
2004 to 2007. This research team conducted a survey among Swiss households and designed 
a simulation of the car market. The project produced ex ante evaluative information about 
the effects on energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions that result from changes 
expected in the behaviour of the buyers of new cars. These calculations were complemented 
with findings from behavioural economics.  
Case 3 – From consensus to high conflict in a tale of direct democracy 
In Bern, the taxation scheme was discussed during the revision of the Law on the Taxation of 
Road Vehicles between 2008 and 2012. The government proposed to offer a time-limited 
discount of 20 to 80 per cent on the taxes for newly bought cars in the two best energy 
                                                     
17  See e.g. Hammer, Maibach, and Marti (2001); Iten, et al. (2005). Only Hammer and Maibach (1999) focused on 
the cantons. 
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cars 
Buyers of new cars 
Outcome 
invest in development of energy-
efficient cars 
Producers / sellers of new cars 
invest in more optional equipment 
or larger cars 
Buyers of new cars 
Discount (and penalty) on taxes 
for newly purchased cars based 
on the energy-label (and CO2 
emissions) 
Output 
intended 
unintended 
Outcome Impact Output 
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categories, and to impose a permanent penalty on the taxes for newly bought cars in the two 
worst categories and for cars older than 20 years. The committee largely followed the 
government's proposal; the only modification was that all amendments became effective in 
2011 and not only the taxation scheme18. In the parliament, four minority proposals about the 
taxation scheme were discussed, two on the duration of the discount in the first reading and 
two on the transitional provisions in the second reading. All four minority proposals were 
rejected. The SVP brought forward three of these proposals. Additional minority proposals 
on the penalty were made by the SVP and discussed in the committee, but withdrawn from 
the plenary meeting.  
The interviews and the documents suggest that the taxation scheme was comparatively little 
contested in the pre-parliamentary and parliamentary phases, but became part of a very 
political question after the referendum was launched. All the interviewees described the 
process in the committee and the parliament as "very harmonious" (Case3-MP2) or 
"consensus-driven" (Case3-MP1). The bill passed the final vote with more than 80 per cent of 
the votes. A referendum with counterproposal was afterwards launched on the initiative of a 
private citizen. It was supported by the SVP, who had formerly largely supported the law, 
and the cantonal trade association. The counterproposal intended to introduce only a 
discount but no penalty and to reduce the basic tax rate by 33.3 per cent. The focus of the 
discussion shifted completely to the level of the vehicle taxes, as Bern’s are among the 
highest of all the cantons. In a third reading, the committee and the parliament 
recommended rejection of the counterproposal. The referendum in 2011 was extremely tight, 
with just 363 votes more in favour of the counterproposal19. As some of the municipalities 
                                                     
18   A reduction of the basic tax rate of 5.6 per cent was also discussed. 
19  351 800 votes cast 
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had destroyed the ballot papers in the meantime, the votes could not be recounted. In the 
second vote in 2012, the voters clearly favoured the counterproposal. 
Analytical use 
The interviews suggest that the administration, and to a lesser extent the MPs, used 
evaluations analytically in the policy process. According to the civil servant interviewed, the 
administration systematically assessed and documented all the studies they used. Through 
the whole process, the administration relied on one expert, whom they knew from previous 
projects. The expert was commissioned to evaluate the bill and was invited to present it to all 
the MPs and later at a media conference. Consequently, the MPs interviewed were mostly 
informed by the administration and by the expert’s presentation, which was held before the 
deliberation in the committee. About 60 of the 160 MPs attended the presentation, in which 
the expert summarized the expert's report and talked about "how the car buyer ticks" (Case3-
Admin). All the MPs interviewed said that this presentation helped them gain an 
understanding of the issue. They could remember consulting the expert's report or the 
"behavioural studies" (Case3-MP1). One of the opposing MPs found the expert's report, 
however, to contain "not only a factual component, but also a political component" (Case3-
MP2). This led the MP to look for studies on the national level and to consult with the federal 
administration, which in turn confirmed the MP's impression of bias in the information 
communicated by the cantonal administration and the expert. Nevertheless, all the MPs 
interviewed felt well informed, and two MPs affirmed that the expert's opinion and other 
studies represented a foundation necessary to forming an opinion and making a decision.  
Political use 
While many references and instances of political use by the executive can be observed 
throughout the whole policy process, the MPs particularly alluded to evaluations in the 
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plenary debate. The governmental documents in the pre-parliamentary phase20 contain more 
than a dozen references to the ETHZ project, its studies, and the expert’s report. Based on 
these references, the government justified why a penalty should be introduced. They were 
also used to explain why some categories of cars should receive a penalty, and it was cited 
that the bill’s impact was calculated as a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions of 10000 to 
15000 tons (Government Council of the Canton of Bern, 2009). Only the social democrats 
referred to the ETHZ project and the "proven" effectiveness of taxation schemes in their 
answer to the consultation21. In the committee deliberation, the administration later repeated 
the references made in the documents. The MPs did not refer to evaluations during the 
committee meetings. In contrast, five MPs in total referred to evaluations during the plenary 
meeting. For instance, one liberal MP stated that “the ETHZ assumes a steering effect of only 
5 per cent on the newly purchased cars. […] It is thus primarily about setting a political and 
psychological sign that the energy efficiency of a vehicle can make a little contribution to less 
harm the environment when buying a car22." The Government Council also referred to the 
evaluations, as "several research reports and an expert's report from the ETHZ confirm that 
[…] this proposal will attain the intended effects 23 ." During the reading of the 
counterproposal, the expert's report was mentioned once by the government but never by 
the MPs.  
                                                     
20  Documentation for the consultation procedure, government's proposal 
21  Social democratic party of the Canton of Bern (2008). Stellungnahme zur Änderung des Gesetzes über die 
Besteuerung der Strassenfahrzeuge (BSFG) [Position statement to the amendment of the Law on the Taxation of Road 
Vehicles (BSFG)], http://www.spbe.ch/index.php?id=29 (28.01.2016). 
22  Journal of the Cantonal Parliament of Bern, August 31, 2009, p. 800. 
23  Journal of the Cantonal Parliament of Bern, August 31, 2009, p. 803. 
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In brief, conflict in Case 3 was initially low, but then increased radically after a referendum 
with counterproposal was launched. The MPs used evaluations analytically and politically, 
mostly before the referendum was requested.  
Case 4 – An ever highly contested issue with preconceived positions 
In Zurich, the taxation scheme was discussed during the revision of the Motor Vehicle 
Taxation Law between 2009 and 2012. The government proposed to give a 4-year limited 
discount on the taxes of 50 to 80 per cent depending on the energy category and the cars’ 
emissions. The committee then proposed more strict emission limits for the discount and a 
taxation scheme for delivery vans. In parliament, the taxation scheme was discussed on the 
basis of nine minority proposals. Seven of these minority proposals concerned the taxation 
scheme for cars. One proposal was to reject the taxation scheme, while three proposals each 
put forward more or less restrictive provisions. Two minority proposals suggested more 
restrictive provisions on the taxation scheme for delivery vans. All proposals were rejected, 
and the parliament adopted the committee's version of the bill. One MP interviewed 
commented that, while the taxation scheme was clearly the bill’s most contested measure, 
the high number of minority proposals "was not as bad as it seemed" (Case4-MP1) because 
the proposals concerned mostly the cars’ emission limits.  
The documents and interviews also suggest that the taxation scheme was highly contested 
from the beginning. The parties’ announcements in their press releases early showed the 
possibility of a so-called unholy alliance of the left-wing Greens and the right-wing SVP. 
While the taxation scheme was not ecological enough for the Greens, the SVP was 
completely against raising taxes and introducing a taxation scheme. Six previous attempts to 
revise the Motor Vehicle Taxation Law had failed before, either in parliament or in a 
referendum, and the priority of the government was to design a bill that eventually found 
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consensus. The taxation scheme was seen as the pivotal element of the law, but only a slight 
discount and no penalty was therefore considered, with the aim of achieving a majority. The 
interviewees further described the inclusion of a discount for delivery vans as another key to 
consensus. According to the interviews, the MPs on the proponents' side were not sure 
whether a referendum would be held. Ultimately, the SVP requested a referendum together 
with the trade association, but they lost the vote.  
Analytical use 
The interviews suggest that the administration used evaluations rather indirectly to 
elaborate the bill, while the MPs’ analytical use varied considerably. The administration was 
involved in the preparation of the model scheme and knew the experts and some of the 
studies, but they did not solicit any specific study or expert, as "there were so many insights 
available from failed projects" (Case4-Admin). Consequently, the administration considered 
the consultation procedure as more important than expertise in order to elaborate a bill that 
would pass an eventual referendum. Researching on the Internet, one MP on the proponent's 
side found a presentation by the expert who had collaborated with Bern. This led the MP to 
propose to invite the expert to the committee's hearings, as the MP saw "that the expert had 
something concrete to say to the matter" (Case4-MP3). The committee was consequently 
mostly informed about the taxation scheme by the administration and the expert24. The MP 
interviewed on the opponents' side could not remember the expert, as there were so many 
hearings, the MP said. This MP thus focused on his own calculations of the taxes for specific 
car models (Case4-MP2). In contrast, the two other MPs interviewed remembered the brief 
presentation and described it as "very well-grounded" (Case4-MP1) and "excellent" (Case4-
                                                     
24  An expert on the health consequences of motorised traffic was also invited to the hearing, but that expert’s 
presentation did not refer to the taxation scheme. 
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MP3). The MP who invited the expert further said that this hearing was important for the 
whole committee, as the expert explained the taxation scheme’s psychological effect. Besides 
this presentation, the MPs did not recall any other analytical use in the parliamentary phase. 
Five committee members asked questions of the expert or other invitees during the hearing, 
but it is difficult to discern whether these questions were asked to become informed or were 
used as an argumentative tool. 
Political use 
Only sporadic observations of political use are found in the pre-parliamentary and 
parliamentary phases. Both the documentation for the consultation procedure and the 
government's proposal explained that the foundations of the taxation scheme were 
elaborated in collaboration with the ETHZ, among others. The parties did not refer to any 
evaluations in their answers within the consultation procedure or in the press releases, 
although the taxation scheme was a central element in these documents. In the committee 
phase, the administration did not cite evaluations, and only one MP referred to the expert’s 
presentation. During the hearing, as mentioned, five MPs asked questions that may be 
interpreted as either analytical or political use. For example, one MP asked whether the 
expert could confirm the steering effect of the taxation scheme after the expert had already 
emphasized this steering effect in the presentation before. In the plenary debate, the 
committee speaker referred to the expert’s presentation. In addition, a MP from the SVP 
asked for a regulatory impact assessment of the bill. As this request was made very late in 
the policy process, this can be interpreted as tactical (i.e., political) use to delay the process.  
Taken together, Case 4 was highly contested throughout the policy process. One MP 
interviewed used evaluations analytically, while the other interviewees could not remember 
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or only vaguely remembered the expert’s presentation. Political, mostly tactical use of 
evaluations by the MPs is observed sporadically. 
Case comparison and discussion 
This paper examines the use of evaluations in four case studies of policy processes in two 
Swiss cantonal parliaments and focuses on the role of the political conflict. Table 1 
summarizes the findings of the case studies. In order to discuss the theoretical expectations 
concerning political conflict, the summary focuses on the MPs’ use. Moreover, categories of 
conflict and evaluation use are employed for the purpose of comparison. Note that these 
categories, and consequently the following remarks, refer specifically and comparatively to 
the four cases investigated. 
Table 1: Summary of the case studies 
 UBB  
Bern 
Case 1 
UBB  
Zurich 
Case 2 
Taxation scheme 
Bern 
Case 3 
Taxation scheme 
Zurich 
Case 4 
Political conflict low rather low moderate high 
Analytical use no very little moderate little 
Political use no little moderate little 
 
Firstly, as previous research has suggested, it was expected that MPs most often use 
evaluations analytically in situations with a moderate level of political conflict (Jenkins-
Smith & Sabatier, 1993). In such situations, MPs should both feel the need to inform 
themselves and be open to evidence. The case studies show this expected pattern of use. 
Most analytical use is observed in the comparatively moderately contested Case 3. Yet, it 
remains puzzling why analytical use in Case 2 and Case 3 should differ so considerably. 
Secondly, again in line with previous research, it was expected that political conflict and MPs’ 
political use of evaluations are positively related (Frey, 2012; Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993; 
Whiteman, 1985). If political conflict is high, MPs presumably want to “make their ‘best case’” 
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(Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993, p. 49). In this respect, evaluations can provide arguments or 
serve as a tactical instrument to delay a decision. This expected pattern of use is only partly 
observed in the case studies. The most contested case, Case 4, confounds expectations, 
because only little political use is observed. The most political use is observed again in the 
moderately contested Case 3. Thirdly, concerning the relationship of analytical and political 
uses, the case studies show that if one form occurred, the other form also did. This finding 
corroborates previous research on evaluation use in Switzerland (Frey, 2012). 
The largest inconsistencies with theoretical expectations thus concern the relationship of 
political conflict and political use. Why did comparatively little political use occur in the 
most contested case, Case 4? Looking at Case 3 in Bern can provide insights. The political 
conflict varied in Case 3. At first, the taxation scheme was considered as an ecological issue, 
and the policy process was described as consensus driven. In this phase, the analysis shows 
both analytical and political use by the MPs. After the counterproposal was launched, the 
discussion shifted to the level of vehicle taxes, and political conflict increased. In this second 
phase, both political and analytical use are observed considerably less often. This latter phase 
consequently resembles Case 4, but neither supports the theoretical expectations. Clearly, 
most political use was observed in the first phase of Case 3. This phase is characterized by a 
very active administration. It drew systematically on evaluations and referred to them 
extensively. In addition, the administration used the expert in a somewhat political manner 
to inform and convince the MPs. As the administration was equally active in both phases of 
Case 3 but analytical and political use are observed less often in the more contested second 
phase, the political conflict seems to limit the administration’s role. Another characteristic of 
the first phase of Case 3 is the MPs’ considerable analytical use. This implies that an active 
administration can facilitate MPs’ analytical use, which then can result in political use.  
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The observation of different kinds of political use supports this implication. MPs mostly 
used evaluations to argue for a proposal in the first phase of Case 3, while they mostly used 
evaluations for tactical purposes in the highly contested phases of Case 3 and Case 4. 
Theoretically, it was expected that both kinds of political use increase with the level of 
conflict. Analytical use seems therefore to facilitate political use for argumentative purposes. 
However, the example of one MP in Case 4 shows that factors beyond the individual level 
seem to affect this kind of political use, as this MP used evaluations analytically but not 
politically in his argumentation.  
These explanations concerning the cases involving taxation schemes for energy-efficient cars 
can be applied to some extent to the cases involving UBB. The seemingly large difference 
between the analytical use in Case 2 (UBB) and Case 3 (taxation scheme) could thus be 
explained by the active administration in Case 3. Still, the question remains whether 
differences between the two measures could have affected evaluation use. In contrast to the 
taxation scheme, the UBB seems not only to be a very technical measure, but also simple to 
understand. However, the most important difference seems to concern the measures’ novelty: 
While the taxation scheme was newly adopted, the UBB had already been introduced in the 
1980s and 1990s. Interviewees in both cantons indicated that the UBB was fiercely debated in 
previous policy processes. Evaluation use might therefore be low because both the UBB and 
the positions were already clearly known. 
These comparisons and explanations are limited to four cases of rather technical, energy-
policy measures in Swiss cantons. More research is needed to assess when what kind of 
political conflict has what effect on which form of use. In this respect, the results concerning 
the taxation scheme, considered as either an ecological or taxation issue, point to the 
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importance of the framing of the conflict. Lastly, this article does not address evaluation 
influence.  
To conclude, this paper provides a fine-grained picture of both evaluation use and political 
conflict. While the context factor of political conflict has been early and much studied, the 
paper’s findings suggest extending its conception. They indicate that political conflict goes 
beyond the disagreement of actors. It is, for instance, shaped by how the issue is framed and 
can change over time. Most importantly, political conflict does not have to affect the 
evaluation users of interest directly but can relate to other factors. As both this and previous 
works show, the administration can facilitate MPs’ evaluation use in non-professional Swiss 
parliaments (Frey & Widmer, 2011; Widmer, 2009). The paper’s findings also confirm that 
this role is shaped and limited by the political conflict and thus whether a referendum is 
expected (Sager & Rissi, 2011; Widmer & Neuenschwander, 2004). Therefore, the dynamics 
of the Swiss system also hinder technocratic policymaking in parliaments precisely when 
much is at stake. 
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